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ABSTRACT
Graph neural networks (GNNs) are widely used in many applica-
tions. However, their robustness against adversarial aacks are
criticized. Prior studies shows that using unnoticeable modica-
tions on graph topology or nodal features can signicantly reduce
the performances of GNNs. It is very challenging to design robust
graph neural networks against poisoning aack and several eorts
have been taken. Existing work aims at reducing the negative im-
pact from adversarial edges only with the poisoned graph, which is
sub-optimal since they fail to discriminate adversarial edges from
normal ones. On the other hand, clean graphs from similar domains
as the target poisoned graph are usually available in real world. By
perturbing these clean graphs, we create supervised knowledge to
train the ability to detect adversarial edges so that the robustness
of GNNs is elevated. However, such potential for clean graphs is
neglected by existing work. To this end, we investigate a novel prob-
lem of improving the robustness of GNNs against poisoning aacks
by exploring clean graphs. Specically, we propose PA-GNN, which
relies on a penalized aggregation mechanism that directly restrict
the negative impact of adversarial edges by assigning them lower
aention coecients. To optimize PA-GNN for a poisoned graph,
we design a meta-optimization algorithm that trains PA-GNN to
penalize perturbations using clean graphs and their adversarial
counterparts, and transfers such ability to improve the robustness
of PA-GNN on the poisoned graph. Experimental results on four
real-world datasets demonstrate the robustness of PA-GNN against
poisoning aacks on graphs.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Graph neural networks (GNNs) [8, 13, 18], which explore the power
of neural networks for graph data, have achieved remarkable results
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in various applications such as social recommendation [9] and
natural language processing [16, 40]. e key to the success of
GNNs is its signal-passing process [34], where information from
neighbors is aggregated for every node in each layer. e collected
information enriches node representations, preserving both nodal
feature characteristics and topological structure.
ough GNNs are eective for modeling graph data, the way that
GNNs aggregate neighbor nodes’ information for representation
learning makes them vulnerable to adversarial aacks [7, 35, 37, 41,
42]. Poisoning aack on a graph [41], which adds/deletes carefully
chosen edges to the graph topology or injects carefully designed
perturbations to nodal features, can contaminate the neighborhoods
of nodes, bring noises/errors to node representations, and degrade
the performances of GNNs signicantly. e lack of robustness
become a critical issue of GNNs in many applications such as nan-
cial system and risk management [1]. For example, fake accounts
created by a hacker can add friends with normal users on social
networks to promote their scores predicted by a GNN model. A
model that’s not robust enough to resist such “cheap” aacks could
lead to serious consequences. Hence, it is important to develop
robust GNNs against adversarial aacks. Recent studies of adver-
sarial aacks on GNNs suggest that adding perturbed edges is more
eective than deleting edges or adding noises to node features [35].
is is because node features are usually high-dimensional, requir-
ing larger budgets to aack. Deleting edges only result in the loss
of some information while adding edges is cheap to contaminate
information passing dramatically. For example, adding a few bridge
edges connecting two communities can aect the latent represen-
tations of many nodes. us, we focus on defense against the more
eective poisoning aacks that a training graph is poisoned with
injected adversarial edges.
To defend against the injected adversarial edges, a natural idea
is to delete these adversarial edges or reduce their negative impacts.
Several eorts have been made in this direction [17, 35, 39]. For
example, Wu et al. [35] utilize Jaccard similarity of features to prune
perturbed graphs with the assumption that connected nodes have
high feature similarity. RGCN in [39] introduce Gaussian constrains
on model parameters to absorb the eects of adversarial changes.
e aforementioned models only rely on the poisoned graph for
training, leading to sub-optimal solutions. e lack of supervised
information about real perturbations in a poisoned graph obstructs
models from modeling the distribution of adversarial edges. ere-
fore, exploring alternative supervision for learning the ability to
reduce the negative eects of adversarial edges is promising.
ere usually exist clean graphs with similar topological distri-
butions and aribute features to the poisoned graph. For example,
Yelp and Foursquare have similar co-review networks where the
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nodes are restaurants and two restaurants are linked if the num-
ber of co-reviewers exceeds a threshold. Facebook and Twier
can be treated as social networks that share similar domains. It is
not dicult to acquire similar graphs for the targeted perturbed
one. As shown in existing work [19, 29], because of the similarity
of topological and aribute features, we can transfer knowledge
from source graphs to target ones so that the performance on tar-
get graphs is elevated. Similarly, we can inject adversarial edges
to clean graphs as supervisions for training robust GNNs, which
are able to penalize adversarial edges. Such ability can be further
transferred to improve the robustness of GNNs on the poisoned
graph. Leveraging clean graphs to build robust GNNs is a promis-
ing direction. However, prior studies in this direction are rather
limited.
erefore, in this paper, we investigate a novel problem of ex-
ploring clean graphs for improving the robustness of GNNs against
poisoning aacks. e basic idea is rst learning to discriminate ad-
versarial edges, thereby reducing their negative eects, then trans-
ferring such ability to a GNN on the poisoned graph. In essence,
we are faced with two challenges: (i) how to mathematically utilize
clean graphs to equip GNNs with the ability of reducing negative
impacts of adversarial edges; and (ii) how to eectively transfer
such ability learned on clean graphs to improve the robustness
of GNNs on a poisoned graph. In an aempt to solve these chal-
lenges, we propose a novel framework Penalized Aggregation GNN
(PA-GNN). Firstly, clean graphs are aacked by adding adversarial
edges, which serve as supervisions of known perturbations. With
these known adversarial edges, a penalized aggregation mechanism
is then designed to learn the ability of alleviating negative inu-
ence from perturbations. We further transfer this negative eect
alleviation ability to the target poisoned graph with a special meta-
optimization approach, so that the robustness of GNNs is elevated.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the rst one to propose a GNN
that can directly penalize perturbations and to leverage transfer
learning for enhancing the robustness of GNN models. e main
contributions of this paper are:
• We study a new problem and propose a principle approach of ex-
ploring clean graphs for learning a robust GNN against poisoning
aacks on a target graph;
• We provide a novel framework PA-GNN, which is able to alleviate
the negative eects of adversarial edges with carefully designed
penalized aggregation mechanism, and transfer the alleviation
ability to the target poisoned graph with meta-optimization;
• We conduct extensive experiments on real-world datasets to
demonstrate the eectiveness of PA-GNN against various poi-
soning aacks and to understand its behaviors.
e rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review related
work in Section 2. We dene our problems in Section 3. We intro-
duce the details of PA-GNN in Section 4. Extensive experiments and
their results are illustrated and analyzed in Section 5. We conclude
the paper in Section 6.
2 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we briey review related works, including graph
neural networks, adversarial aack and defense on graphs.
2.1 Graph Neural Networks
In general, graph neural networks refer to all deep learning methods
for graph data [36]. It can be generally categorized into two cate-
gories, i.e., spectral-based and spatial-based. Spectral-based GNNs
dene “convolution” following spectral graph theory [3]. e rst
generation of GCNs are developed by Bruna et al. [3] using spectral
graph theory. Various spectral-based GCNs are developed later on
[8, 14, 18, 20]. To improve eciency, spatial-based GNNs are pro-
posed to overcome this issue [11, 13, 23, 25]. Because spatial-based
GNNs directly aggregate neighbor nodes as the convolution, and
are trained on mini-batches, they are more scalable than spectral-
based ones. Recently, Velicˇkovic´ et al. [32] propose graph aention
network (GAT) that leverages self-aention of neighbor nodes for
the aggregation process. e major idea of GATs [38] is focusing
on most important neighbors and assign higher weights to them
during the information passing. However, existing GNNs aggregates
neighbors’ information for representation learning, making them vul-
nerable to adversarial aacks, especially perturbed edges added to
the graph topology. Next, we review adversarial aack and defense
methods on graphs.
2.2 Adversarial Attack and Defense on Graphs
Neural networks are widely criticized due to the lack of robustness
[5, 6, 12, 21], and the same to GNNs. Various adversarial aack
methods have been designed, showing the vulnerability of GNNs
[2, 4, 7]. ere are two major categories of adversarial aack meth-
ods, namely evasion aack and poisoning aack. Evasion aack
focuses on generating fake samples for a trained model. Dai et al.
[7] introduce an evasion aack algorithm based on reinforcement
learning. On the contrary, poisoning aack changes training data,
which can decrease the performance of GNNs signicantly. For
example, Zu¨gner et al. [41] propose neack which make GNNs
fail on any selected node by modifying its neighbor connections.
ey further develop metaack [42] that reduces the overall perfor-
mance of GNNs. Comparing with evasion aack, poisoning aack
methods are usually stronger and can lead to an extremely low
performance [39, 41], because of its destruction of training data.
Besides, it is almost impossible to clean up a graph which is already
poisoned. erefore, we focus on defending the poisoning aack
of graph data in this paper.
How to improve the robustness of GNNs against adversarial
poising aacks is aracting increasing aention and initial eorts
have been taken [17, 35, 37, 39]. For example, Wu et al. [35] utilize
the Jaccard similarity of features to prune perturbed graphs with
the assumption that connected nodes should have high feature
similarity. RGCN in [39] adopts Gaussian distributions as the node
representations in each convolutional layer to absorb the eects of
adversarial changes in the variances of the Gaussian distributions.
e basic idea of aforementioned robust GNNs against poisoning
aack is to alleviate the negative eects of the perturbed edges.
However, perturbed edges are treated equally as normal edges
during aggregation in existing robust GNNs.
e proposed PA-GNN is inherently dierent from existing
works: (i) instead of purely trained on the poisoned target graph,
adopting clean graphs with similar domains to learn the ability of
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alleviating negative eects of adversarial edges; and (ii) investigat-
ing meta-learning to transfer such ability to the target poisoned
graph for improving the robustness.
3 PRELIMINARIES
3.1 Notations
We use G = (V, E,X) to denote a graph, whereV = {v1, . . . ,vN }
is the set of N nodes, E ⊆ V ×V represents the set of edges, and
X = {x1, . . . , xN } indicates node features. In a semi-supervised
seing, partial nodes come with labels and are dened asVL , where
the corresponding label for node v is denoted by yv . Note that the
topology structure of G is damaged, and the original clean version
is unknown. In addition to the poisoned graph G, we assume there
exists M clean graphs sharing similar domains with G. For example,
when G is the citation network of publications in data mining eld,
a similar graph can be another citation network from physics. We
use {G1, . . . ,GM } to represent clean graphs. Similarly, each clean
graph consists of nodes and edges. We use VLi to denote the labeled
nodes in graph Gi .
3.2 Basic GNN Design
We introduce the general architecture of a graph neural network.
A graph neural network contains multiple layers. Each layer trans-
forms its input node features to another Euclidean space as output.
Dierent from fully-connected layers, a GNN layer takes rst-order
neighbors’ information into consideration when transforming the
feature vector of a node. is “message-passing” mechanism en-
sures the initial features of any two nodes can aect each other
even if they are faraway neighbors, along with the network going
deeper. e input node features to the l-th layer in an L-layer GNN
can be represented by a set of vectors Hl = {hl1, . . . , hlN }, hli ∈ Rdl ,
where hli corresponds to vi . Obviously, H
1 = X. e output node
features of the l-th layer, which also formulate the input to the next
layer, are generated as follows:
hl+1i = Update
[
hli , Agg(hlj |j ∈ Ni )
]
(1)
where Ni is the set of rst-order neighbors of node i , Agg(·) in-
dicates a generic aggregation function on neighbor nodes, and
Update(·) is an update function that generates a new node repre-
sentation vector from the previous one and messages from neigh-
bors. Most graph neural networks follow the above denition.
For example, Hamilton et al. [13] introduce mean, pooling and
LSTM as the aggregation function, Velicˇkovic´ et al. [32] leverage
self-aention mechanism to update node representations. A GNN
can be represented by a parameterized function fθ where θ repre-
sents parameters, the loss function can be represented as Lc (θ ). In
semi-supervised learning, the cross-entropy loss function for node
classication takes the form:
Lc (θ ) = −
∑
v ∈VL
yv log yˆv , (2)
where yˆv is the predicted label generated by passing the output
from the nal GNN layer to a somax function.
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Figure 1: Overall framework of PA-GNN. icker arrows in-
dicate higher attention coecients. θ∗ denotes the model
initialization from meta-optimization.
3.3 Problem Denition
With the aforementioned notations and denitions, the problem of
exploring clean graphs for learning a robust GNN against poisoning
aacks on a target graph is formally dened as:
Given the target graph G that is poisoned with adversarial edges, a
set of clean graphs {G1, . . . ,GM } from similar domain as G, and the
partially labeled nodes of each graph (i.e., {VL1 , . . . ,VLM ;VL}), we
aim at learning a robust GNN to predict the unlabeled nodes of G.
It is worth noting that, in this paper, we learn a robust GNN for semi-
supervised node classication. e proposed PA-GNN is a general
framework for learning robust GNN of various graph mining tasks
such as link prediction.
4 PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
In this section, we give the details of PA-GNN. An illustration of the
framework is shown in Figure 1. Firstly, clean graphs {G1, . . . ,GM }
are introduced to generate perturbed edges. e generated per-
turbations then serve as supervised knowledge to train a model
initialization for PA-GNN using meta-optimization. Finally, we
ne-tune the initialization on the target poisoned graph for the
best performance. anks to the meta-optimization, the ability to
reduce negative eects of adversarial aack is retained aer adapt-
ing to G. In the following sections, we introduce technical details
of PA-GNN.
4.1 Penalized Aggregation Mechanism
We begin by analyzing the reason why GNNs are vulnerable to
adversarial aacks with the general denition of GNNs in Equation
1. Suppose the graph data fed into a GNN is perturbed, the aggre-
gation function Agg(·) treats “fake” neighbors equally as normal
ones, and propagates their information to update other nodes. As
a result, GNNs fail to generate desired outputs under inuence of
adversarial aacks. Consequently, if messages passing through
perturbed edges are ltered, the aggregation function will focus on
“true” neighbors. In an ideal condition, GNNs can work well if all
perturbed edges produced by aackers are ignored.
Motivated by above analysis, we design a novel GNN with pe-
nalized aggregation mechanism (PA-GNN) which automatically
restrict the message-passing through perturbed edge. Firstly, we
adopt similar implementation from [31] and dene the self-aention
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coecient ali j for node features ofvi andvj on the l-the layer using
a non-linear function:
ali j = LeakyReLU
((al )>[Wlhli ⊕Wlhlj ]), (3)
where al and Wl are parameters, > represents the transposition,
and ⊕ indicates the concatenation of vectors. Note that coecients
are only dened for rst-order neighbors. Takevi as an example,we
only compute ali j for j ∈ Ni , which is the set of direct neighbors of
vi . e aention coecients related to vi are further normalized
among all nodes in Ni for comparable scores:
α li j =
exp
(
ali j
)∑
k ∈Ni exp
(
alik
) . (4)
We use normalized aention coecient scores to generate a lin-
ear combination of their corresponding node features. e linear
combination process serves as the aggregating process, and its re-
sults are utilized to update node features. More concretely, a graph
neural network layer is constructed as follows:
hl+1i = σ
( ∑
j ∈Nj
α li jW
lhlj
)
. (5)
A similar denition can be found in [32]. Clearly, the above design
of GNN layer cannot discriminate perturbed edges, let alone alle-
viate their negative eects on the “message-passing” mechanism,
because there is no supervision to teach it how to honor normal
edges and punish perturbed ones. A natural solution to this prob-
lem is reducing the aention coecients for all perturbed edges in
a poisoned graph. Noticing the exponential rectier in Equation 4,
a lower aention coecient only allows lile information passing
through its corresponding edge, which mitigate negative eects if
the edge is an adversarial one. Moreover, since normalized aen-
tion coecient scores of one node always sum up to 1, reducing the
aention coecient for perturbed edges will also introduce more
aention to clean neighbors. To measure the aention coecients
received by perturbed edges, we propose the following metric:
Sp =
L∑
l=1
∑
ei j ∈P
ali j , (6)
where L is the total number of layers in the network, and P denotes
the perturbed edges. Generally, a smallerSp indicates less aention
coecients received by adversarial edges. To further train GNNs
such that a lower Sp is guaranteed, we design the following loss
function to penalize perturbed edges:
Ldist = −min
(
η, E
ei j ∈E\P
1≤l≤L
ali j − E
ei j ∈P
1≤l≤L
ali j
)
, (7)
where η is a hyper parameter controlling the margin between mean
values of two distributions, E\P represents normal edges in the
graph, and E computes the expectation. Using the expectation of
aention coecients for all normal edges as an anchor, Ldist aims
at reducing the averaged aention coecient of perturbed edges,
until a certain discrepancy of η between these two mean values is
satised. Note that minimizing Sp directly instead of Ldist will
lead to unstable aention coecients, making PA-GNN hard to
converge. e expectations of aention coecients are estimated
by their empirical means:
E
ei j ∈E\P
1≤l≤L
ali j =
1
L|E\P|
L∑
l=1
∑
ei j ∈E\P
ali j , (8)
E
ei j ∈P
1≤l≤L
ali j =
1
L|P |
L∑
l=1
∑
ei j ∈P
ali j , (9)
where | · | denotes the cardinality of a set. We combine Ldist with
the original cross-entropy lossLc and create the following learning
objective for PA-GNN:
min
θ
L = min
θ
(Lc + λLdist ), (10)
where λ balances the semi-supervised classication loss and the
aention coecient scores on perturbed edges.
Training PA-GNN with the above objective directly is non-trivial,
because it is unlikely to distinguish exact perturbed edges P from
normal edges in a poisoned graph. However, it is practical to dis-
cover vulnerable edges from clean graphs with adversarial aack
methods on graphs. For example, metaack poisons a clean graph
to reduces the performance of GNNs by adding adversarial edges,
which can be treated as the set P. erefore, we explore clean
graphs from domains similar to the poisoned graph. Specically, as
shown in Figure 1, we rst inject perturbation edges to clean graphs
using adversarial aack methods, then leverage those adversarial
counterparts to train the ability to penalize perturbed edges. Such
ability is further transferred to GNNs on the target graph, so that
the robustness is improved. In the following section, we discuss
how we transfer the ability to penalize perturbed edges from clean
graphs to the target poisoned graph in detail.
4.2 Transfer with Meta-Optimization
As discussed above, it is very challenging to train PA-GNN for a
poisoned graph because the adversarial edge distribution remains
unknown. We turn to exploit clean graphs from similar domains to
create adversarial counterparts that serve as supervised knowledge.
One simple solution to utilize them is pre-training PA-GNN on
clean graphs with perturbations, which formulate the set of adver-
sarial edges P. en the pre-trained model is ne-tuned on target
graph G purely with the node classication objective. However,
the performance of pre-training with clean graphs and adversarial
edges is rather limited, because graphs have dierent data distribu-
tions, making it dicult to equip GNNs with a generalized ability
to discriminate perturbations. Our experimental results in Section
5.3 also conrm the above analysis.
In recent years, meta-learning has shown promising results in
various applications [24, 27, 30, 33]. e goal of meta-learning is to
train a model on a variety of learning tasks, such that it can solve
new tasks with a small amount or even no supervision knowledge
[10, 15]. Finn et al. [10] propose model-agnostic meta-learning
algorithm where the model is trained explicitly such that a small
number of gradient steps and few training data from a new task can
also produce good generalization performance on that task. is
motivates us to train a meta model with a generalized ability to
penalize perturbed edges (i.e., assign lower aention coecients).
e meta model serve as the initialization of PA-GNN, and its fast-
adaptation capability helps retain such penalizing ability as much as
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possible on the target poisoned graph. To achieve the goal, we pro-
pose a meta-optimization algorithm that trains the initialization of
PA-GNN. With manually generated perturbations on clean graphs,
PA-GNN receive full supervision and its initialization preserve the
penalizing ability. Further ne-tuned model on the poisoned graph
G is able to defend adversarial aacks and maintain an excellent
performance.
We begin with generating perturbations on clean graphs. State-
of-the-art adversarial aack method for graph – metaack [42]
is chosen. Let Pi represent the set of adversarial edges created
for clean graph Gi . Next, we dene learning tasks for the meta-
optimization. e learning objective of any task is dened in Equa-
tion 10, which aims at classifying nodes accurately while assigning
low aention coecient scores to perturbed edges on its corre-
sponding graph. Let Ti denote the specic task for Gi . Namely,
there are M tasks in accordance with clean graphs. Because clean
graphs are specied for every task, we use LTi (θ ) to denote the
loss function of task Ti . We then compile support sets and query
sets for learning tasks. Labeled nodes from each clean graph is split
into two groups – one for the support set and the other as the query
set. Let Si and Qi denote the support set and the query set for Gi ,
respectively.
Given M learning tasks, the optimization algorithm rst adapts
the initial model parameters to every learning task separately. For-
mally, θ becomes θ ′i when adapting to Ti . We use gradient descent
to compute the updated model parameter θ ′i . e gradient w.r.t θ
′
i
is evaluated using LTi (θ ) on corresponding support set Si , and the
initial model parameters θ are updated as follows:
θ ′i = θ − α∇θLTi (θ ), (11)
where α controls the learning rate. Note that only one gradient
step is shown in Equation 11, but using multiple gradient updates
is a straightforward extension, as suggested by [10]. ere are M
dierent versions of the initial model (i.e., fθ ′i , · · · , fθ ′M ) constructed
in accordance with learning tasks.
e model parameters are trained by optimizing for the perfor-
mance of fθ ′i with respect to θ across all tasks. More concretely, we
dene the following objective function for the meta-optimization:
min
θ
M∑
i=1
LTi (θ ′i ) = minθ
M∑
i=1
LTi (θ − α∇θ LTi (θ )). (12)
Because both classifying nodes and penalizing adversarial edges
are considered by the objective of PA-GNN, model parameters will
preserve the ability to reduce the negative eects from adversarial
aacks while maintaining a high accuracy for the classication.
Note that we perform meta-optimization over θ with the objective
computed using the updated model parameters θ ′i for all tasks. Con-
sequently, model parameters are optimized such that few numbers
of gradient steps on a new task will produce maximally eective
behavior on that task. e characteristic of fast-adaptation on new
tasks would help the model retain the ability to penalize perturbed
edges on G, which is proved by the experiential results in Section
5.3.1. Formally, stochastic gradient descent (SGD) is used to update
model parameters θ cross tasks:
θ ← θ − β∇θ
M∑
i=1
LTi (θ ′i ). (13)
In practice, the above gradients are estimated using labeled nodes
from query sets Si of all tasks. Our empirical results suggest that
spliing support sets and query sets on-the-y through iterations
of the meta-optimization improves overall performance. We adopt
this strategy for the training procedure of PA-GNN.
Training AlgorithmAn overview of the training procedure of PA-
GNN is illustrated in Algorithm 1. Adversarial edges are injected to
clean graphs using metaack (Line 2 to 4). Support sets and query
sets are randomly split on-the-y for each task in Line 7. We then
adapt initial model parameter θ to θ ′i for each task Ti . e model
parameters are updated by optimizing for the performance of all
fθ ′i w.r.t θ using labeled nodes from query sets (Line 11). Finally,
we adapt the trained model initialization to the targeted poisoned
graph by minimizing the classication loss Lc on G.
Algorithm 1: e training framework of PA-GNN
Input: G and {G1, . . . ,GM }
Output: Model parameters θ
1 Randomly initialize θ ;
2 for Gi = G1, . . . ,GM do
3 Select perturbed edge set Pi with metaack;
4 end
5 while not early-stop do
6 for Gi = G1, . . . ,GM do
7 Split labeled nodes of Gi into support set Si and Qi ;
8 Evaluating ∇θLTi (θ ) with Si and LTi ;
9 Compute adapted parameters θ ′i with gradient descent:
θ ′i ← θ − α∇θLTi (θ );
10 end
11 Update θ on {Q1, . . . ,QM } with:
θ ← θ − β∇θ
∑M
i=1 LTi (θ ′i );
12 end
13 Fine-tune θ on G use Lc ;
5 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we conduct experiments to evaluate the eectiveness
of PA-GNN. We aim to answer the following questions:
• Can PA-GNN outperform existing robust GNNs under represen-
tative and state-of-the-art adversarial aacks on graphs?
• How the penalized aggregation mechanism and the meta-optimization
algorithm contribute to PA-GNN?
• How sensitive of PA-GNN on the hyper-parameters?
Next, we start by introducing the experimental seings followed
by experiments on node classication to answer these questions.
5.1 Experimental Setup
5.1.1 Datasets. To conduct comprehensive studies of PA-GNN,
we conduct experiments under two dierent seings:
• Same-domain seing: We sample the poisoned graph and clean
graphs from the same data distribution. Two popular bench-
mark networks (i.e., Pubmed [28] and Reddit [13]) are selected
as large graphs. Pubmed is a citation network where nodes are
documents and edges represent citations; Reddit is compiled
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Table 1: Statistics of datasets
Pubmed Reddit Yelp-Small Yelp-Large
Avg. # of nodes 1061 3180 3426 15757
Avg. # of edges 2614 14950 90431 160893
# of features 500 503 200 25
# of classes 3 7 2 2
from reddit.com where nodes are threads and edges denote two
threads are commented by a same user. Both graphs build nodal
features using averaged word embedding vectors [22] of docu-
ments/threads. We create desired graphs using sub-graphs of
the large graph. Each of them is randomly split into 5 similar-
size non-overlapping sub-graphs. One graph is perturbed as
the poisoned graph, while the remained ones are used as clean
graphs.
• Similar-domain seing: We put PA-GNN in real-world seings
where graphs come from dierent scenarios. More concretely, we
compile two datasets from Yelp Review1, which contains point-
of-interests (POIs) and user reviews from various cities in North-
ern American. Firstly, each city in Yelp Review is transferred
into a graph, where nodes are POIs, nodal features are averaged
word-embedding vector [26] of all reviews that a POI received,
and binary labels are created to tell whether corresponding POIs
are restaurants. We further dene edges using co-reviews (i.e.,
reviews from the same author). Graphs from dierent cities have
dierent data distribution because of the dierences in tastes,
culture, lifestyle, etc. e rst dataset (Yelp-Small) contains four
middle-scale cities including Cleveland, Madison, Mississauga,
and Glendale where Cleveland is perturbed as G. e second
dataset (Yelp-Large) contains top-3 largest cities including Char-
loe, Phoenix, and Toronto. Specically, we inject adversarial
edges to the graph from Toronto to validate the transferability of
PA-GNN because Toronto is a foreign city compared with others.
We itemize statistics of datasets in Table 1. We randomly select 10%
of nodes for training, 20% for validation and remained for testing
on all datasets (i.e., on G). 40% nodes from each clean graph are
selected to build support and query sets, while remained ones are
treated as unlabeled. Support sets and query sets are equally split
on-the-y randomly for each iteration of the meta-optimization
(i.e., aer θ is updated) to ensure the maximum performance.
5.1.2 Aack Methods. To evaluate how robust PA-GNN is under
dierent aack methods and seings, three representative and state-
of-the-art adversarial aack methods on graphs are chosen:
• Non-Targeted Aack: Non-targeted aack aims at reducing the
overall performance of GNNs. We adopt metaack [42] for non-
targeted aack, which is also state-of-the-art adversarial aack
method on graph data. We increase the perturbation rate (i.e.,
number of perturbed edges over all normal edges) from 0 to 30%,
by a step size of 5% (10% for Yelp-Large dataset due to the high
computational cost of metaack). We use the seing with best
aack performance according to [42].
• Targeted Aack: Targeted aack focuses on misclassifying spe-
cic target nodes. neack [41] is adopted as the targeted aack
method. Specically, we rst randomly perturb 500 nodes with
neack on target graph, then randomly assign them to training,
validating, and testing sets according to their proportions (i.e.,
1hps://www.yelp.com/dataset
1:2:7). is creates a realistic seing since not all nodes will be
aacked (hacked) in a real-world scenario, and perturbations
can happen in training, validating and testing sets. We adopt the
original seing for neack from [41].
• Random Aack: Random aack randomly select some node
pairs, and ip their connectivity (i.e., remove existing edges and
connect non-adjacent nodes). It can be treated as an injecting
random noises to a clean graph. e ratio of the number of
ipped edges to the number of clean edges varies from 0 to 100%
with a step size of 20%.
We evaluate compared methods against state-of-the-art non-targeted
aack method metaack on all datasets. We analyze the perfor-
mances against targeted aack on Reddit and Yelp-Large datasets.
For random aack, we compare each method on Pubmed and Yelp-
Small datasets as a complementary. Consistent results are observed
on remained datasets.
5.1.3 Baselines. We compare PA-GNN with representative and
state-of-the-art GNNs and robust GNNs. e details are:
• GCN [18]: GCN is a widely used graph neural network. It denes
graph convolution via spectral analysis. We adopt the most
popular version from [18].
• GAT [13]: As introduced in Section 2.1, GAT leverages multi-
head self-aention to assign dierent weights to neighborhoods.
• PreProcess [35]: is method improves the robustness of GNNs
by removing existing edges whose connected nodes have low
feature similarities. Jaccard similarity is used sparse features and
Cosine similarity is adopted for dense features.
• RGCN [39]: RGCN aims to defend against adversarial edges
with Gaussian distributions as the latent node representation in
hidden layers to absorb the negative eects of adversarial edges.
• VPN [17]: Dierent from GCN, parameters of VPN are trained
on a family of powered graphs of G. e family of powered
graphs increases the spatial eld of normal graph convolution,
thus improves the robustness.
Note that PreProcess, RGCN and VPN are state-of-the-art robust GNNs
developed to defend against adversarial aacks on graphs.
5.1.4 Seings and Parameters. We report the averaged results of
10 runs for all experiments. We deploy a multi-head mechanism [31]
to enhance the performance of self-aention. We adopt metaack
to generate perturbations on clean graphs. All hyper-parameters
are tuned on the validation set to achieve the best performance. For
a fair comparison, following a common way [39], we x the number
of layers to 2 and the total number of hidden units per layer to 64
for all compared models. We set λ to 1.0 and η to 100 for all seings.
Parameter sensitivity on λ and η will be analyzed in Section 5.4.
We perform 5 gradient steps to estimate θ ′ as suggested by [10].
5.2 Robustness Comparison
To answer the rst question, we evaluate the robustness of PA-
GNN under various adversarial aack scenarios with comparison
to baseline methods. We adopt semi-supervised node classication
as our evaluation task as described in Section 5.1.4.
5.2.1 Defense Against Non-Targeted Aack. We rst conduct
experiments under non-targeted aack on four datasets. Each ex-
periment is conducted 10 times. e average accuracy with standard
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Table 2: Node classication performance (Accuracy±Std) under non-targetedmetaack [42]
Dataset Ptb Rate (%) 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Pubmed
GCN 77.81±0.34 76.00±0.24 74.74±0.55 73.69±0.37 70.39±0.32 68.78±0.56 67.13±0.32
GAT 74.28±1.80 70.19±1.59 69.36±1.76 68.79±1.34 68.29±1.53 66.35±1.95 65.47±1.99
PreProcess 73.69±0.42 73.49±0.29 73.76±0.45 73.60±0.26 73.85±0.48 73.46±0.55 73.65±0.36
RGCN 77.81±0.24 78.07±0.21 74.86±0.37 74.31±0.35 70.83±0.28 67.63±0.21 66.89±0.48
VPN 77.92±0.93 75.83±1.14 74.03±2.84 74.31±0.93 70.14±1.26 68.47±1.11 66.53±1.09
PA-GNN 82.92±0.13 81.67±0.21 80.56±0.07 80.28±0.25 78.75±0.17 76.67±0.42 75.47±0.39
Reddit
GCN 96.33±0.13 91.87±0.18 89.26±0.16 87.26±0.14 85.55±0.17 83.50±0.14 80.92±0.27
GAT 93.81±0.35 92.13±0.49 89.88±0.60 87.91±0.45 85.43±0.61 83.40±0.39 81.27±0.38
PreProcess 95.22±0.18 95.14±0.19 88.40±0.35 87.00±0.27 85.70±0.25 83.59±0.27 81.17±0.30
RGCN 93.15±0.44 89.20±0.37 85.81±0.35 83.58±0.29 81.83±0.42 80.22±0.36 76.42±0.82
VPN 95.91±0.17 91.95±0.17 89.03±0.28 86.97±0.15 85.38±0.24 83.49±0.29 80.85±0.28
PA-GNN 95.80±0.11 94.35±0.33 92.16±0.49 90.74±0.56 88.44±0.20 86.60±0.17 84.45±0.34
Yelp-Small
GCN 87.27±0.31 74.54±0.98 73.44±0.35 73.30±0.83 72.16±0.88 69.70±0.90 68.55±0.85
GAT 86.22±0.18 81.09±0.31 76.29±0.74 74.21±0.51 73.43±0.78 71.80±0.69 70.58±1.22
PreProcess 86.53±0.97 82.89±0.33 73.52±1.59 72.99±0.68 71.72±0.99 70.38±0.62 69.31±1.32
RGCN 88.19±0.31 79.70±0.69 77.25±2.12 75.85±1.31 75.65±0.33 74.71±0.21 73.30±2.95
VPN 86.05±1.60 78.13±0.38 74.36±1.54 74.33±0.59 72.54±0.35 71.86±0.78 70.13±1.72
PA-GNN 86.53±0.18 86.34±0.18 84.17±0.17 82.41±0.46 77.69±0.25 76.77±0.60 76.20±0.39
Yelp-Large
GCN 84.21±0.48 − 80.96±1.66 − 80.56±1.69 − 78.64±0.46
GAT 84.73±0.22 − 81.25±0.36 − 79.82±0.42 − 77.81±0.39
PreProcess 84.54±0.25 − 82.16±4.12 − 78.80±2.17 − 78.05±2.63
RGCN 85.09±0.13 − 79.42±0.27 − 78.31±0.08 − 77.74±0.12
VPN 84.36±0.23 − 82.77±0.25 − 80.64±2.41 − 79.22±2.32
PA-GNN 84.98±0.16 − 84.66±0.09 − 82.71±0.29 − 81.48±0.12
deviation is reported in Table 2. From the table, we make the follow-
ing observations: (i) As illustrated, the accuracy of vanilla GCN and
GAT decays rapidly when the perturbation rate goes higher, while
other robust GNN models achieve relatively higher performance in
most cases. is suggests the necessity of improving the robustness
of GNN models; (ii) e prepossessing-based method shows consis-
tent results on the Pubmed dataset with sparse features. However, it
fails for other datasets. Because the feature similarity and neighbor
relationship are oen complementary, purely relying on feature
similarity to determining perturbation edges is not a promising solu-
tion. On the contrary, PA-GNN aims at learning the ability to detect
and penalizing perturbations from data, which is more dynamic
and reliable; (iii) Comparing with RGCN, PA-GNN achieves higher
performance under dierent scenarios. is is because PA-GNN
successfully leverages clean graphs for improving the robustness.
Moreover, instead of constraining model parameters with Gaussian
distributions, PA-GNN directly restricts the aention coecients of
perturbed edges, which is more straightforward. e above obser-
vations articulate the ecacy of PA-GNN, which successfully learns
to penalize perturbations thanks to the meta-optimization on clean
graphs. Lastly, we point out that PA-GNN achieves slightly higher
or comparable performance even if G is clean (i.e., no adversarial
edges), showing the advantage of the meta-optimization process.
5.2.2 Defense Against Targeted Aack. We further study how
robust PA-GNN is under targeted aack. As shown in Table 3,
PA-GNN outperforms all the compared methods under targeted
aack, with approximate 5% performance improvements on both
datasets compared with second accurate methods. is conrms
the reliability of PA-GNN against targeted aack. Moreover, note
that the perturbations of clean graphs are generated by metaack,
which is a non-target adversarial aack algorithm. We conclude
that PA-GNN does not rely on specic adversarial aack algorithm
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Figure 2: Node classication accuracy under random attack.
to train model initialization. e ability to penalize perturbation can
be generalized to defend other adversarial aacks. A similar con-
clusion can be drawn from following experiments against random
aack.
5.2.3 Defense Against Random Aack. Finally, we evaluate all
compared methods against random aack. As shown in Figure 2,
PA-GNN consistently out-performs all compared methods. anks
to the meta-optimization process, PA-GNN successfully learns to
penalize perturbations, and transfers such ability to target graph
with a dierent kind of perturbation. Besides, the low performance
of GAT indicates the vulnerability of the self-aention, which con-
rms the eectiveness of the proposed penalizing aggregation mech-
anism.
5.3 Ablation Study
To answer the second question, we conduct ablation studies to
understand the penalized aggregation and meta-optimization algo-
rithm.
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Table 3: Node classication accuracy under targeted attack.
Dataset GCN GAT PreProcess RGCN VPN PA-GNN
Reddit 74.25±0.20 73.83±0.12 73.02±0.18 74.75±0.15 74.00±0.07 79.57±0.13
Yelp-Large 71.97±0.12 71.12±0.73 74.83±0.12 77.01±0.24 72.09±0.73 82.28±0.49
Table 4: Node classication accuracy of ablations.
Ptb Rate (%) 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
PA-GNNnp 95.25±0.81 92.17±0.23 90.45±0.72 88.72±0.61 86.66±0.18 84.68±0.52 81.53±0.34
PA-GNN2nd 77.11±0.67 75.43±1.11 71.18±1.24 68.51±1.95 64.86±1.59 63.16±1.29 61.08±1.07
PA-GNNf t 96.72±0.09 91.89±0.14 89.79±0.24 87.56±0.25 85.41±0.17 83.88±0.35 82.14±0.38
PA-GNNjt 96.63±0.18 92.13±0.19 88.62±0.35 87.00±0.27 84.65±0.25 82.75±0.27 81.20±0.30
PA-GNN 95.80±0.11 94.35±0.33 92.16±0.49 90.74±0.56 88.44±0.20 86.60±0.17 84.45±0.34
Table 5: Mean values of attention coecients.
Normal edges Ptb. edges
W/o penalty 12.63 12.80
With penalty 4.76 3.86
5.3.1 Varying the Penalized AggregationMechanism. We analyze
the eect of proposed penalized aggregation mechanism from two
aspects. Firstly, we propose PA-GNNnp , a variant of PA-GNN that
removes the penalized aggregation mechanism by seing λ = 0. We
validate PA-GNNnp on Reddit dataset, and its performance against
dierent perturbation rates is reported in Table 4. As we can see,
PA-GNN consistently out-performs PA-GNNnp by 2% of accuracy.
e penalized aggregation mechanism limits negative eects from
perturbed edges, in turns improves the performance on the target
graph. Secondly, we explore distributions of aention coecient
on the poisoned graph of PA-GNN with/without the penalized ag-
gregation mechanism. Specically, the normalized distributions of
aention coecients for normal and perturbed edges are ploed in
Figure 3. We further report their mean values in Table 5. Without
the penalized aggregation, perturbed edges obtain relatively higher
aention coecients. is explains how adversarial aacks hurt the
aggregation process of a GNN. As shown in Figure 3b, normal edges
receive relative higher aention coecients through PA-GNN, con-
rming the ability to penalize perturbations is transferable since
PA-GNN is ne-tuned merely with the node classication objective.
ese observations rearm the eectiveness of the penalized ag-
gregation mechanism and the meta-optimization algorithm, which
successfully transfers the ability to penalize perturbations in the
poisoned graph.
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Figure 3: Distributions of attention coecients in PA-GNN.
5.3.2 Varying the Meta-Optimization Algorithm. Next, we study
the contribution of the meta-optimization algorithm. As discussed
in Section 4.2, three ablations are created accordingly: PA-GNN2nd ,
PA-GNNf t , and PA-GNNjt . PA-GNN2nd ignores clean graphs and
rely on a second-time aack to generate perturbed edges. PA-GNNf t
omit the meta-optimization process, training the model initializa-
tion on clean graphs and their adversarial counterparts jointly. We
then ne-tune the initialization for G using the classication loss
Lc . PA-GNNjt further simplies PA-GNNf t by adding G to the
joint training step. Note that we remove Ldist for G because de-
tailed perturbation information is unknown for a poisoned graph.
All three variants are evaluated on Reddit dataset, and their perfor-
mance is reported in Table 4.
PA-GNN2nd performs the worst among all variations. Because
perturbed edges from the adversarial aack can signicantly hurt
the accuracy, treating them as clean edges is not a feasible solution.
PA-GNNf t , and PA-GNNjt slightly out-perform PA-GNN when G
is clean. is is not amazing since more training data can contribute
to the model. However, their performance decreases rapidly as
the perturbation rate raises up. Because the data distribution of
a perturbed graph is changed, barely aggregate all available data
is not an optimal solution for defending adversarial aack. It is
vital to design PA-GNN which leverages clean graphs from similar
domains for improving the robustness of GNNs. At last, PA-GNNnp
consistently out-performs PA-GNNf t , and PA-GNNjt in perturbed
cases. shown advantages of the meta-optimization algorithm which
utilizes clean graphs to train the model regardless of the penalized
aggregation mechanism.
5.4 Parameter Sensitivity Analysis
We investigate the sensitivity of η and λ for PA-GNN. η controls the
penalty of perturbed edges, while λ balances the classication objec-
tive and the penalized aggregation mechanism. Generally, a larger
η pull the distribution of perturbed edges farther away from that of
normal edges. We explore the sensitivity on Pubmed and Reddit
datasets, both with a 10% perturbation rate. We alter η and λ among
{0, 1, 10, 100, 1000} and {0, 50, 100, 200, 400, 800}, respectively. e
performance of PA-GNN is illustrated in Figure 4. As we can see,
the accuracy of PA-GNN is relatively smooth when parameters are
within certain ranges. However, extremely large values of η and
λ result in low performances on both datasets, which should be
avoided in practice. Moreover, increasing λ from 0 to 1 improves the
accuracy on both datasets, demonstrating the proposed penalized
aggregation mechanism can improve the robustness of PA-GNN.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we study a new problem of exploring extra clean
graphs for learning a robust GNN against the poisoning aacks
on a target graph. We propose a new framework PA-GNN, that
leverages penalized aention mechanism to learn the ability to
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Figure 4: Parameter sensitivity analysis.
reduce the negative impact from perturbations on clean graphs and
meta-optimization to transfer the alleviation ability to the target
poisoned graph. Experimental results of node classication tasks
demonstrate the ecacy of PA-GNN against dierent poisoning
aacks such as targeted aack (metatack), non-targeted aack (ne-
taack) and random aack. Further experiments are conducted to
understand the contribution of the key components of PA-GNN and
its parameter sensitivity. In the future, we would like to explore the
potential of transfer learning for improving robustness on other
models, such as community detection and graph classication.
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